

1 **Instructions For Race Discrimination Claims Under 42 U.S.C § 1981**

2
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4
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1 **6.0 Section 1981 Introductory Instruction**

2 **Model**

3 In this case the Plaintiff _____ has made a claim under the Federal Civil Rights statute
4 that prohibits discrimination against [an employee] [an applicant for employment] because of the
5 person’s race.

6 Specifically, [plaintiff] claims that [he/she] was [describe the employment action at issue]
7 by defendant[s] _____ because of [plaintiff’s] race.

8 [Defendant] denies that [plaintiff] was discriminated against in any way. Further,
9 [defendant] asserts that [describe any affirmative defenses].

10 I will now instruct you more fully on the issues you must address in this case.

11
12 **Comment**

13 Referring to the parties by their names, rather than solely as “Plaintiff” and “Defendant,”
14 can improve jurors’ comprehension. In these instructions, bracketed references to “[plaintiff]” or
15 “[defendant]” indicate places where the name of the party should be inserted.

16 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits race discrimination in the making and enforcing of contracts. It
17 prohibits racial discrimination against whites as well as nonwhites. *See McDonald v. Santa Fe*
18 *Trail Transp. Co.*, 427 U.S. 273, 295 (1976) (Section 1981 was intended to "proscribe
19 discrimination in the making or enforcement of contracts against, or in favor of, any race"). In
20 *Runyon v. McCrary*, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), the Supreme Court held that Section 1981 regulated
21 private conduct as well as governmental action.¹

22 In *Patterson v. McLean Credit Union*, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), the Supreme Court restricted

¹ Though Section 1981 regulates both public and private action, the Court of Appeals has held that Section 1981 does not provide a *remedy* for a government actor’s violation of its terms. *See McGovern v. City of Philadelphia*, 554 F.3d 114, 122 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[N]o implied private right of action exists against state actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.”). *See generally* Comment 6.1.7 (discussing *McGovern*). A claim against a government actor for a violation of Section 1981 can in appropriate circumstances be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For discussion of Section 1983 claims, see generally Chapter 4.

6.1.2 Disparate Treatment – Pretext

23 the application of Section 1981 to claims arising out of the formation of the contract. But the Civil
24 Rights Act of 1991 legislatively overruled the Supreme Court's decision in *Patterson*, providing
25 that the clause "to make and enforce contracts" in Section 1981 "includes the making, performance,
26 modification and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and
27 conditions of the contractual relationship." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b). "[A] plaintiff cannot state a claim
28 under § 1981 unless he has (or would have) rights under the existing (or proposed) contract that
29 he wishes 'to make and enforce.'" *Domino's Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald*, 546 U.S. 470, 479-80
30 (2006).

31 The protections afforded by Section 1981 may in many cases overlap with those of Title
32 VII. But the standards and protections of the two provisions are not identical. For example, a
33 Section 1981 plaintiff does not have to fulfill various prerequisites, including the completion of
34 the EEOC administrative process, before bringing a court action. Also, Title VII applies only to
35 employers with 15 or more employees, whereas Section 1981 imposes no such limitation.²
36 Employees cannot be sued under Title VII, but they can be sued under Section 1981. On the other
37 hand, Title VII protects against discrimination on the basis of sex, creed or color as well as race,
38 while Section 1981 prohibits racial discrimination only. Title VII and Section 1981 are subject to
39 different limitations periods as well. *See Cardenas v. Massey*, 269 F.3d 251, 266 (3d Cir. 2001).

40 For ease of reference, these pattern instructions provide a separate set of instructions
41 specifically applicable to Section 1981 claims. But where both Section 1981 and Title VII are both
42 applicable, and the instructions for both provisions are substantively identical, there is no need to
43 give two sets of instructions. In such cases, these Section 1981 instructions can be used because
44 the claim will have to be one sounding in race discrimination. The Comment will note if a Section
45 1981 instruction is substantively identical to a Title VII instruction.

46 With respect to claims for wrongful termination, the First Amendment's religion clauses
47 give rise to an affirmative defense that "bar[s] the government from interfering with the decision
48 of a religious group to fire one of its ministers." *Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &*

² Indeed, persons other than employers can be sued under Section 1981. *See, e.g., Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc.*, 808 F.3d 208, 220 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that independent contractors can bring claims under Section 1981). Conversely, the fact that a person is an employer for purposes of Title VII liability does not necessarily establish the existence of a contractual relationship for purposes of Section 1981. *Compare id.* at 209 (holding that jury question existed as to whether the client of a temporary-staffing agency counted as an employer of one of the agency's employees for Title VII purposes), *with id.* at 220 (holding that the temporary-worker plaintiff's Section 1981 claim was appropriately dismissed on summary judgment because "the record does not indicate that [the plaintiff] entered into a contract with [the staffing agency's client] or ever attempted to do so").

6.1.2 Disparate Treatment – Pretext

49 *Sch. v. EEOC*, 132 S. Ct. 694, 702, 709 n.4 (2012). Though *Hosanna-Tabor* involved a retaliation
50 claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Court’s broad description of the issue
51 suggests that its recognition of a “ministerial exception” may apply equally to wrongful-
52 termination claims and discriminatory refusals to hire brought under other federal anti-
53 discrimination statutes. *See id.* at 710 (“The case before us is an employment discrimination suit
54 brought on behalf of a minister, challenging her church’s decision to fire her. . . . [T]he ministerial
55 exception bars such a suit.”). *Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru*, 140 S. Ct. 2049
56 (2020), applied the exception to discrimination claims under both the Age Discrimination in
57 Employment Act and Americans with Disabilities Act, and there is little doubt that the exception
58 applies to Section 1981 and Title VII. Further, while the discharge in *Hosanna-Tabor* implicated
59 religious principles of the employer, the schools in *Our Lady of Guadalupe* were held entitled to
60 the protection of the exception even though the decisions challenged there were said to be based
61 on secular concerns. *Id.* at 2058 (“The school maintains that it based its decisions on classroom
62 performance—specifically, Morrissey-Berru’s difficulty in administering a new reading and
63 writing program, which had been introduced by the school’s new principal as part of an effort to
64 maintain accreditation and improve the school’s academic program.”); *id.* at 2059 (“The school
65 maintains that the decision was based on [Biel’s] poor performance—namely, a failure to observe
66 the planned curriculum and keep an orderly classroom.”). For further discussion of the ministerial
67 exception, see Comment 5.0.

68 **6.1.2 Elements of a Section 1981 Claim— Disparate Treatment— Pretext**

69 In this case [plaintiff] is alleging that [defendant] [describe alleged disparate treatment]
70 [plaintiff]. In order for [plaintiff] to recover on this discrimination claim against [defendant],
71 [plaintiff] must prove that [defendant] intentionally discriminated against [plaintiff]. This means
72 that [plaintiff] must prove that [his/her] race was a determinative factor in [defendant’s] decision
73 to [describe action] [plaintiff].

74 To prevail on this claim, [plaintiff] must prove both of the following by a preponderance
75 of the evidence:

76 First: [Defendant] [failed to hire [plaintiff]] [failed to renew [plaintiff’s] employment
77 arrangement] [failed to promote [plaintiff]] [demoted [plaintiff]] [terminated [plaintiff]]
78 [constructively discharged [plaintiff]] [or otherwise discriminated against [plaintiff] in a
79 serious and tangible way with respect to [plaintiff’s] compensation, terms, conditions, or
80 privileges of employment]; and

81 Second: [Plaintiff’s] race was a determinative factor in [defendant’s] decision.

82 Although [plaintiff] must prove that [defendant] acted with the intent to discriminate,

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83 [plaintiff] is not required to prove that [defendant] acted with the particular intent to violate
84 [plaintiff’s] federal civil rights. Moreover, [plaintiff] is not required to produce direct evidence of
85 intent, such as statements admitting discrimination. Intentional discrimination may be inferred
86 from the existence of other facts.

87 You should weigh all the evidence received in the case in deciding whether [defendant]
88 intentionally discriminated against [plaintiff]. [For example, you have been shown statistics in this
89 case. Statistics are one form of evidence that you may consider when deciding whether a defendant
90 intentionally discriminated against a plaintiff. You should evaluate statistical evidence along with
91 all the other evidence.]

92 [Defendant] has given a nondiscriminatory reason for its [describe defendant’s action]. If
93 you believe [defendant’s] stated reason and if you find that the [adverse employment action] would
94 have occurred because of defendant’s stated reason regardless of [plaintiff’s] race, then you must
95 find for [defendant]. If you disbelieve [defendant’s] stated reason for its conduct, then you may,
96 but need not, find that [plaintiff] has proved intentional discrimination. In determining whether
97 [defendant’s] stated reason for its actions was a pretext, or excuse, for discrimination, you may not
98 question [defendant’s] business judgment. You cannot find intentional discrimination simply
99 because you disagree with the business judgment of [defendant] or believe it is harsh or
100 unreasonable. You are not to consider [defendant’s] wisdom. However, you may consider whether
101 [plaintiff] has proven that [defendant’s] reason is merely a cover-up for discrimination.

102 Ultimately, you must decide whether [plaintiff] has proven that [his/her] race was a
103 determinative factor in [defendant’s employment decision.] “Determinative factor” means that if
104 not for [plaintiff’s] race, the [adverse employment action] would not have occurred.

105

106 **Comment**

107 Instruction 6.1.2 is substantively identical to the pretext instruction given for Title VII
108 cases. *See* Instruction 5.1.2.³ Where the plaintiff seeks recovery under both Title VII and Section
109 1981, this instruction may be given for both causes of action.

³ Instruction 5.1.2’s first element includes a bracketed alternative for failure to renew an employment arrangement as an adverse employment action. That alternative is based on *Wilkerson v. New Media Tech. Charter School, Inc.*, 522 F.3d 315, 320 (3d Cir. 2008). *Wilkerson* involved a Title VII retaliation claim rather than a Section 1981 claim; thus, it does not provide direct authority for the inclusion of such an alternative in Instruction 6.1.2.

6.1.2 Disparate Treatment – Pretext

110 Causation

111 This instruction is framed in terms of “determinative factor” causation, which is typically
112 used synonymously with “but-for” causation. That is clearly correct in light of the Supreme
113 Court’s decision in *Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of African American-Owned Media*, 140 S. Ct.
114 1009 (2020), which held that proving a violation of Section 1981 required plaintiff to show that
115 the adverse action would not have occurred but for the racial motivation: “To prevail, a plaintiff
116 must initially plead and ultimately prove that, but for race, it would not have suffered the loss of
117 a legally protected right.” *Id.* at 1019. *See also Williams v. Tech. Mahindra (Ams.) Inc.*, 70 F.4th
118 646, 651-52 (3d Cir. 2023) (affirming that, after *Comcast*, for a plaintiff to prevail on a § 1981
119 claim he must prove that but for his race, he would not have been discriminated against in the
120 making or enforcing of contracts, but noting that the “indirect methods of proof formulated by
121 the Supreme Court for employment discrimination claims under Title VII . . . may be applied to
122 claims under § 1981 for employment discrimination when the methods of proof were formulated
123 ‘in a context where but-for causation was the undisputed test.’”) (quoting *Comcast*, 140 S. Ct. at
124 1019)); *Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.*, 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (but-for causation governs
125 ADEA discrimination claims); *University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar*, 133
126 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (but-for causation governs Title VII retaliation claims).

127 This means there is no longer any relevance to a possible distinction between direct and
128 circumstantial evidence of discrimination, which was sometimes used as the dividing line
129 between a mixed-motive instruction and a pretext instruction. Further, given the but-for standard,
130 there is no longer a place in Section 1981 cases for a “same decision anyway” affirmative defense,
131 either to liability or as a limitation on relief.

132 Discriminatory Intent or Motive

133 Discriminatory intent is required to support a claim under Section 1981. *Patterson v.*
134 *McLean Credit Union*, 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989) (holding that Section 1981 requires
135 discriminatory intent and that the burden-shifting framework set by *McDonnell Douglas v. Green*,
136 411 U.S. 792 (1973), applies to Section 1981 claims). *See also Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.*, 777
137 F.2d 113, 135 (3d Cir. 1985) (Section 1981 requires a showing of intent to discriminate on the
138 basis of race); *Stehney v. Perry*, 101 F.3d 925, 937 (3d Cir.1996) (“[A] facially neutral policy does
139 not violate equal protection solely because of disproportionate effects” because Section 1981
140 provides a cause of action “for intentional discrimination only.”).

141 If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination,⁴ the burden shifts to the

⁴ The court of appeals has adapted the prima facie case as follows for the purpose of a

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142 defendant to produce evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged
143 employment action. *See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks*, 509 U.S. 502, 506–07 (1992). *See also*
144 *Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen*, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir.1993) (pretext turns on the
145 qualifications and criteria identified by the employer, not the categories the plaintiff considers
146 important). If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must persuade the jury that the
147 defendant's stated reason was merely a pretext for race discrimination, or in some other way prove
148 it is more likely than not that race motivated the employer. *Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v.*
149 *Burdine*, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). The plaintiff retains the ultimate burden of persuading the jury
150 of intentional discrimination. The factfinder's rejection of the employer's proffered reason allows,
151 but does not compel, judgment for the plaintiff. *Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co.*, 100
152 F.3d 1061, 1066-67 (3d Cir.1996) (en banc).

153 In *Smith v. Borough of Wilkesburg*, 147 F.3d 272, 279 (3d Cir.1998), the court held that
154 the question of whether the defendant has met its intermediate burden of production under the
155 *McDonnell Douglas* test is a "threshold matter to be decided by the judge."

156 *Animus of Employee Who Was Not the Ultimate Decisionmaker*

157 For a discussion of the Court's treatment in *Staub v. Proctor Hosp.*, 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011),
158 of the animus of an employee who was not the ultimate decisionmaker, see Comment 5.1.7. *Staub*
159 concerned a statute that used the term "motivating factor," and it is unclear whether the ruling in
160 *Staub* would extend to claims under statutes (such as Section 1981) that do use "determinative
161 factor" causation.

162 *Adverse Employment Action*

163 Section 1981(b) defines "the term 'make and enforce contracts' [to] include[] the making,
164 performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits,

Section 1981 discriminatory-lending claim:

[The] plaintiff must show (1) that he belongs to a protected class, (2) that he applied and was qualified for credit that was available from the defendant, (3) that his application was denied or that its approval was made subject to unreasonable or overly burdensome conditions, and (4) that some additional evidence exists that establishes a causal nexus between the harm suffered and the plaintiff's membership in a protected class, from which a reasonable juror could infer, in light of common experience, that the defendant acted with discriminatory intent.

Anderson v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 275 (3d Cir. 2010).

6.1.2 Disparate Treatment – Pretext

165 privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.” This statutory definition should
166 shape the “adverse employment action” element of Section 1981 employment discrimination
167 claims. Although few precedential Third Circuit cases address that element, the Court of Appeals
168 has stated in dictum that “a wide panoply of adverse employment actions may be the basis of
169 employment discrimination suits under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.”
170 *Clark v. Twp. of Falls*, 890 F.2d 611, 618-19 (3d Cir. 1989). More recently, non-precedential
171 opinions have treated Section 1981 claims and Title VII claims interchangeably with respect to the
172 adverse employment action element. *See, e.g., Barnees v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.*, 598 Fed.
173 Appx. 86, 90 (3d Cir. 2015) (nonprecedential opinion) (“Title VII and section 1981 ... provide
174 relief only if discrimination is ‘serious and tangible enough to alter an employee’s compensation,
175 terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.’” (quoting *Storey v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs.*, 390
176 F.3d 760, 764 (3d Cir. 2004) (a Title VII case), and citing *Thompson v. City of Waco*, 764 F.3d
177 500, 503 (5th Cir. 2014) (a Section 1981 case)). The Committee accordingly has drafted the
178 adverse employment action element in Instruction 6.1.2 to parallel that in Instruction 5.1.1. See
179 Comment 5.1.1 for further discussion of the adverse employment action element in Title VII cases.

180 For further commentary on the standards applicable to pretext cases, see the Comment to
181 Instruction 5.1.2.

6.1.3 Harassment – Hostile Work Environment – Tangible Employment Action

6.1.3 Elements of a Section 1981 Claim — Harassment — Hostile Work Environment — Tangible Employment Action

Model

[Plaintiff] claims that [he/she] was subjected to harassment by [names] and that this harassment was motivated by [plaintiff's] race. [Defendant(s)] [is/are] liable for racial harassment if [plaintiff] proves all of the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence:

First: [Plaintiff] was subjected to [describe alleged conduct or conditions giving rise to plaintiff's claim] by [names].

Second: [Names] conduct was not welcomed by [plaintiff].

Third: [Names] conduct was motivated by the fact that [plaintiff] is [race].

Fourth: The conduct was so severe or pervasive that a reasonable person in [plaintiff's] position would find [plaintiff's] work environment to be hostile or abusive. This element requires you to look at the evidence from the point of view of a reasonable [member of plaintiff's race] reaction to [plaintiff's] work environment.

Fifth: [Plaintiff] believed [his/her] work environment to be hostile or abusive as a result of [names] conduct.

Sixth: [Plaintiff] suffered an adverse “tangible employment action” as a result of the hostile work environment; a tangible employment action is defined as a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing significant change in benefits.

Comment

The standards for a hostile work environment claim are identical under Title VII and Section 1981. *See, e.g., Verdin v. Weeks Marine Inc.*, 124 Fed. Appx. 92, 95 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Regarding Verdin's hostile work environment claim, the same standard used under Title VII applies under Section 1981. *See McKenna v. Pac. Rail Serv.*, 32 F.3d 820, 826 n.3 (3d Cir.1994).”); *Ocasio v. Lehigh Valley Family Health Center*, 92 Fed. Appx. 876, 879-80 (3d Cir. 2004) (“As amended by the 1991 Civil Rights Act, § 1981 now encompasses hostile work environment claims, and we apply the same standards as in a similar Title VII claim.”).

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30 However, while the standards of liability are identical, there is a major difference in the
31 coverage of the two provisions. Under Title VII, only employers can be liable for discrimination
32 in employment. In contrast, Section 1981 prohibits individuals, including other employees, from
33 racial discrimination against an employee. *See Cardenas v. Massey*, 269 F.3d 251, 268 (3d Cir.
34 2001) (“Although claims against individual supervisors are not permitted under Title VII, this
35 court has found individual liability under § 1981 when [the defendants] intentionally cause an
36 infringement of rights protected by Section 1981, regardless of whether the [employer] may also
37 be held liable.”); *Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis College*, 784 F.2d 505, 518 (3d Cir. 1986)
38 (“employees of a corporation may become personally liable when they intentionally cause an
39 infringement of rights protected by Section 1981, regardless of whether the corporation may also
40 be held liable”). Accordingly, the instruction modifies the instruction used for Title VII hostile
41 work environment claims, to specify that individual employees can be liable for acts of racial
42 harassment. *See* Instruction 5.1.4.

43 If the court wishes to provide a more detailed instruction on what constitutes a hostile work
44 environment, such an instruction is provided in 6.2.2.

45 It should be noted that constructive discharge is the adverse employment action that is most
46 common with claims of hostile work environment.⁵ Instruction 6.2.3 provides an instruction
47 setting forth the relevant factors for a finding of constructive discharge. That instruction can be
48 used to amplify the term “adverse employment action” in appropriate cases.

49 The instruction’s definition of “tangible employment action” is taken from *Burlington*
50 *Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth*, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).

51 *Liability for Non-Supervisors*

52 Respondeat superior liability for discriminatory harassment by non-supervisory
53 employees⁸ exists only where “the defendant knew or should have known of the harassment and

⁵ Instruction 6.1.3 is appropriate for use in cases where the evidence supports a claim that the constructive discharge resulted from an official act or acts. However, where the constructive discharge did not result from an official act, an affirmative defense is available to the employer and Instruction 6.1.4 should be used instead. *See* Comment 6.1.4 (discussing *Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders*, 542 U.S. 129, 150 (2004)).

⁸ In the context of Title VII claims, the Supreme Court has held that “an employee is a ‘supervisor’ for purposes of vicarious liability . . . if he or she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim...” *Vance v. Ball State Univ.*, 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013). For further discussion of *Vance*, see Comment 5.1.4.

6.1.3 Harassment – Hostile Work Environment – Tangible Employment Action

54 failed to take prompt remedial action." *Andrews v. City of Philadelphia*, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d
55 Cir. 1990). See also *Kunin v. Sears Roebuck and Co.*, 175 F.3d 289, 294 (3d Cir. 1999):

56 [T]here can be constructive notice in two situations: where an employee provides
57 management level personnel with enough information to raise a probability of . . .
58 harassment in the mind of a reasonable employer, or where the harassment is so pervasive
59 and open that a reasonable employer would have had to be aware of it. We believe that
60 these standards strike the correct balance between protecting the rights of the employee
61 and the employer by faulting the employer for turning a blind eye to overt signs of
62 harassment but not requiring it to attain a level of omniscience, in the absence of actual
63 notice, about all misconduct that may occur in the workplace.

64 For a discussion of the definition of “management level personnel” in a Title VII case, see
65 Comment 5.1.4 (discussing *Huston v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prods. Corp.*, 568 F.3d 100, 108
66 (3d Cir. 2009)).

67 *Severe or Pervasive Activity*

68 The terms “severe or pervasive” set forth in the instruction are in accord with Supreme
69 Court case law and provide for alternative possibilities for finding harassment. See *Jensen v.*
70 *Potter*, 435 F.3d 444, 447, n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The disjunctive phrasing means that ‘severity’ and
71 ‘pervasiveness’ are alternative possibilities: some harassment may be severe enough to
72 contaminate an environment even if not pervasive; other, less objectionable, conduct will
73 contaminate the workplace only if it is pervasive.”) (quoting 2 C.Sullivan et. al., *Employment*
74 *Discrimination Law and Practice* 455 (3d ed. 2002)). See also *Castleberry v. STI Grp.*, 863 F.3d
75 259, 265–66 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that the plaintiffs pleaded facts sufficient to meet the “severe”
76 test at the motion-to-dismiss stage by alleging “that their supervisor used a racially charged slur in
77 front of them and their non-African-American coworker [and that w]ithin the same breath, the use
78 of this word was accompanied by threats of termination (which ultimately occurred)”; *id.* (holding
79 in the alternative that the plaintiffs pleaded facts sufficient to meet the “pervasive” test at the
80 motion-to-dismiss stage by alleging “that not only did their supervisor make the derogatory
81 comment, but ‘on several occasions’ their sign-in sheets bore racially discriminatory comments
82 and that they were required to do menial tasks while their white colleagues (who were less
83 experienced) were instructed to perform more complex work”).

84 *Subjective and Objective Components*

85 The Supreme Court in *Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.*, 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993), explained that
86 a hostile work environment claim has both objective and subjective components. A hostile
87 environment must be “one that a reasonable person would find hostile and abusive, and one that

6.1.3 Harassment – Hostile Work Environment – Tangible Employment Action

88 the victim in fact did perceive to be so.” The instruction accordingly sets forth both objective and
89 subjective components.

90 *Hostile Work Environment That Pre-exists the Plaintiff’s Employment*

91 The instruction refers to harassing “conduct” that “was motivated by the fact that [plaintiff]
92 is a [plaintiff’s race].” This language is broad enough to cover the situation where the plaintiff is
93 the first member of the plaintiff’s race to enter the work environment, and the working conditions
94 pre-existed the plaintiff’s employment. In this situation, the “conduct” is the refusal to change an
95 environment that is hostile to member of the plaintiff’s race. The court may wish to modify the
96 instruction so that it refers specifically to the failure to correct a pre-existing environment.

97 *Quid Pro Quo Claims*

98 These Section 1981 instructions do not include a pattern instruction for quid pro quo
99 claims. This is because quid pro quo claims are almost invariably grounded in sex discrimination,
100 and Section 1981 applies to racial discrimination only. Where a Section 1981 claim is raised on
101 quid pro quo grounds, the court can use Instruction 5.1.3, with the proviso that it must be modified
102 if the supervisor is also being sued for individual liability.

6.1.4 Harassment – Hostile Work Environment – No Tangible Employment Action

1 6.1.4 Elements of a Section 1981 Claim— Harassment — Hostile Work 2 Environment — No Tangible Employment Action

3 Model

4 [Plaintiff] claims that [he/she] was subjected to harassment by [names] and that this
5 harassment was motivated by [plaintiff's] race.

6 [Defendant(s)] [is/are] liable for racial harassment if [plaintiff] proves all of the following
7 elements by a preponderance of the evidence:

8 First: [Plaintiff] was subjected to [describe alleged conduct or conditions giving rise to
9 plaintiff's claim] by [names].

10 Second: [names] conduct was not welcomed by [plaintiff].

11 Third: [names] conduct was motivated by the fact that [plaintiff] is [race].

12 Fourth: The conduct was so severe or pervasive that a reasonable person in [plaintiff's]
13 position would find [plaintiff's] work environment to be hostile or abusive. This element
14 requires you to look at the evidence from the point of view of a reasonable [member of
15 plaintiff's race] reaction to [plaintiff's] work environment.

16 Fifth: [Plaintiff] believed [his/her] work environment to be hostile or abusive as a result of
17 [names] conduct.

18 **[For use when the alleged harassment is by non-supervisory employees:**

19 However, as to [employer], because [names of harassers] are not supervisors, you must
20 also determine whether [employer] is responsible under the law for those acts. For [employer] to
21 be liable for the acts of harassment of non-supervisor employees, plaintiff must prove by a
22 preponderance of the evidence that management level employees knew, or should have known, of
23 the abusive conduct and failed to take prompt and effective remedial action. Management level
24 employees should have known of the abusive conduct if 1) an employee provided management
25 level personnel with enough information to raise a probability of racial harassment in the mind of
26 a reasonable employer, or if 2) the harassment was so pervasive and open that a reasonable
27 employer would have had to be aware of it.]

28 **[In the event this Instruction is given, omit the following instruction regarding the
29 employer's liability.]**

6.1.4 Harassment – Hostile Work Environment – No Tangible Employment Action

30

31 If any of the above elements has not been proved by a preponderance of the evidence, your
32 verdict must be for [defendant(s)] and you need not proceed further in considering this claim. If
33 you find that the elements have been proved, then you must further consider whether the employer
34 is liable for such conduct. An employer may be liable for the actions of its supervisors as I will
35 describe.

36 **[Give instruction (A) when the facts permit a finding either of proxy liability or of**
37 **presumptive liability subject to an affirmative defense. When the alleged individual harasser**
38 **is not highly enough placed to create a triable issue of proxy liability, give only instruction**
39 **(B).]**

40 (A.) An employer is liable when the [individual harasser’s name] is plaintiff’s supervisor and either
41 highly placed enough to be the proxy of the employer or, absent that, when the employer has failed
42 to make out the affirmative defense.

43 With respect to proxy liability, the employer is strictly liable for the conduct of [name] if [name]
44 is highly enough placed within the employer’s hierarchy such that [his/her] conduct is deemed that
45 of the employer. To do so, [name] must exercise exceptional authority and control within the
46 employer but need not be its chief executive officer. In making this determination, you may look
47 at the employer’s formal institutional structure, evidence of how decision-making in fact occurs
48 on a day-to-day basis, and any other evidence you find establishes exceptional authority and
49 control.

50 If you find proxy liability, the employer is liable for the harassment. If you find no proxy
51 liability, the employer is still liable unless it has established an affirmative defense. I will instruct
52 you now on the elements of that affirmative defense.

53 (B). If any of the above elements has not been proved by a preponderance of the evidence, your
54 verdict must be for [defendant] and you need not proceed further in considering this claim. If you
55 find that the elements have been proved, then you must consider whether [name] is the plaintiff’s
56 supervisor. If you so find, you must find for plaintiff unless you also find that the [employer] has
57 proven an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. I will instruct you now on the
58 elements of that affirmative defense.

59 With respect to [employer] you must find for [employer] if you find that [employer] has proved
60 both of the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence:

61 First: That [employer] exercised reasonable care to prevent racial harassment in the
62 workplace, and also exercised reasonable care to promptly correct the harassing behavior

6.1.4 Harassment – Hostile Work Environment – No Tangible Employment Action

63 that does occur.

64 Second: That [plaintiff] unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
65 corrective opportunities provided by [employer].

66 Proof of the following facts will be enough to establish the first element that I just referred
67 to, concerning prevention and correction of harassment:

68 1. [Employer] had established an explicit policy against harassment in the
69 workplace on the basis of race.

70 2. That policy was fully communicated to its employees.

71 3. That policy provided a reasonable way for [plaintiff] to make a claim of
72 harassment to higher management.

73 4. Reasonable steps were taken to correct the problem, if raised by [plaintiff].

74 On the other hand, proof that [plaintiff] did not follow a reasonable complaint procedure
75 provided by [employer] will ordinarily be enough to establish that [plaintiff] unreasonably failed
76 to take advantage of a corrective opportunity.

77 The defense of having an effective procedure for handling racial discrimination complaints
78 is available to the employer only. It has nothing to do with the individual liability of employees
79 for acts of racial discrimination.

80

81 **Comment**

82 As discussed in the Comment to 6.1.3, the Third Circuit as well as other courts have held
83 that the standards for a hostile work environment claim are identical under Title VII and Section
84 1981. However, as also discussed in that Comment, Section 1981 prohibits individuals, including
85 employees, from engaging in acts of racial discrimination. Therefore this instruction modifies the
86 instruction used for Title VII hostile work environment claims, to specify that individual
87 employees can be liable for acts of racial discrimination in creating a hostile work environment.
88 *See* Instruction 5.1.5.

89 If the court wishes to provide a more detailed instruction on what constitutes a hostile work
90 environment, such an instruction is provided in 6.2.2.

6.1.4 Harassment – Hostile Work Environment – No Tangible Employment Action

91 This instruction is to be used in racial harassment cases where the plaintiff did not suffer
92 any "tangible" employment action such as discharge or demotion, but rather suffered "intangible"
93 harm flowing from harassment that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work
94 environment." *Faragher v. Boca Raton*, 524 U.S. 775, 808 (1998). In *Faragher* and in *Burlington*
95 *Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth*, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), the Court held that an employer is strictly liable
96 for supervisor harassment that "culminates in a tangible employment action, such as discharge,
97 demotion, or undesirable reassignment." *Ellerth*, 524 U.S. at 765. But when no such tangible action
98 is taken, the employer may still be liable for harassment by supervisors. Such liability arises in two
99 situations. The first is when the supervisor in question is highly enough placed within the
100 institutional employer to be its "proxy" or "alter ego." The second is where the employer fails to
101 establish an affirmative defense to the presumptive liability that arises from supervisory
102 harassment even when there is no tangible employment action.

103 In *O'Brien v. Middle E. Forum*, 57 F.4th 110 (3d Cir. 2023), the Third Circuit "now join[s]
104 our sister Circuit Courts of Appeals and hold[s] that the *Faragher/Ellerth* defense is unavailable
105 when the alleged harasser is the employer's proxy or alter ego." *Id.* at 120. The opinion used the
106 two terms interchangeably, but the model instruction uses only "proxy" for the sake of simplicity.
107 As for what suffices to satisfy this standard, the rationale for liability is that the institutional
108 employer is itself acting when the harassing conduct is by a proxy or alter ego. Thus, while
109 "merely serving as a supervisor with some amount of control over a subordinate does not establish
110 proxy status," such status can be found "where "an official... [is] high enough in the management
111 hierarchy that his actions 'speak' for the employer." *O'Brien* cautioned that "only individuals with
112 exceptional authority and control within an organization" can meet this standard. 57 F.4th at 121
113 (quoting *Helm v. Kansas*, 656 F.3d 1277, 1286 (10th Cir. 2011)).

114 Applying this concept to the case at hand, the alleged harasser was Gregg Roman,
115 plaintiff's direct supervisor, and the Court found a triable issue as to his being a proxy for the
116 Forum. It wrote:

117 Roman served as the Chief Operating Officer, Director, and Secretary of the Board. The
118 jury heard testimony that . . . he was second in command at the Forum, and was poised to
119 "be the successor to become president of the organization." There was testimony that his
120 job was to "run[] the administration" of the organization; he was the "man in charge" of
121 dictating policies for the day-to-day governance of the Forum's main Philadelphia office,
122 and he was "responsible for all of the administration oversight with anybody that worked
123 at the Forum." The jury also heard testimony about his public-facing role which included
124 making media appearances on behalf of the Forum.

125 *O'Brien*, 57 F.4th at 121-22 (citations omitted). The model instructions look to this paragraph to
126 frame the evidence that may be relevant to the proxy decision in terms of institutional structure,

6.1.4 Harassment – Hostile Work Environment – No Tangible Employment Action

127 day-to-day operations, and other evidence.

128 If proxy liability is not established, an employer may still be liable for supervisor
129 harassment even when no tangible employment action is taken. Such liability arises from the
130 harassing actions of a supervisor unless the employer establishes an affirmative defense. To prevail
131 on the basis of the defense, the employer must prove that "(a) [it] exercised reasonable care to
132 prevent and correct promptly any [discriminatory] harassing behavior," and that (b) the employee
133 "unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by
134 the employer or to avoid harm otherwise." *Ellerth*, 524 U.S. at 751 (1998). *See Swinton v.*
135 *Potomac Corp.*, 270 F.3d 794, 817 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the *Faragher/Ellerth* defense
136 applies to Section 1981 actions in the same manner as in Title VII actions).

137 Besides the affirmative defense provided by *Ellerth*, the absence of a tangible employment
138 action also justifies requiring the plaintiff to prove a further element, in order to protect the
139 employer from unwarranted liability for the discriminatory acts of its non-supervisor employees.⁹
140 Respondeat superior liability for the acts of non-supervisory employees exists only where "the
141 defendant knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial
142 action." *Andrews v. City of Philadelphia*, 895 F.2d 1469, 1486 (3d Cir. 1990). *See also* Comment
143 6.1.3 (discussing *Kunin v. Sears Roebuck and Co.*, 175 F.3d 289, 294 (3d Cir. 1999), and *Huston*
144 *v. Procter & Gamble Paper Prods. Corp.*, 568 F.3d 100, 104 (3d Cir. 2009)).

145 In *Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders*, 542 U.S. 129, 138-41 (2004), the Court considered
146 the relationship between constructive discharge brought about by supervisor harassment and the
147 affirmative defense articulated in *Ellerth* and *Faragher*. The Court concluded that "an employer
148 does not have recourse to the *Ellerth/Faragher* affirmative defense when a supervisor's official act
149 precipitates the constructive discharge; absent such a 'tangible employment action,' however, the
150 defense is available to the employer whose supervisors are charged with harassment."

⁹ In the context of Title VII claims, the Supreme Court has held that "an employee is a 'supervisor' for purposes of vicarious liability . . . if he or she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim..." *Vance v. Ball State Univ.*, 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013). For further discussion of *Vance*, see Comment 5.1.5.

1 **6.1.5 Elements of a Section 1981 Claim — Disparate Impact**

2

3 *No Instruction*

4

5 **Comment**

6 Section 1981 requires proof of intentional discrimination. Thus, there is no cause of action
7 for disparate impact under section 1981. *See, e.g., Pollard v. Wawa Food Market*, 366 F. Supp. 2d
8 247, 252 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (concluding that disparate impact claims “are not actionable under
9 section 1981” because section 1981 requires proof of discriminatory motive, and disparate impact
10 claims do not).

1 **6.1.6 Elements of a Section 1981 Claim — Retaliation**

2
3 **Model**

4 [Plaintiff] claims that [defendant(s)] discriminated against [him/her] because of
5 [plaintiff’s] [describe protected activity].

6 To prevail on this claim, [plaintiff] must prove all of the following by a preponderance of
7 the evidence:

8 First: [Plaintiff] [describe activity protected by Section 1981].

9 Second: [Plaintiff] was subjected to a materially adverse action at the time, or after, the
10 protected conduct took place.

11 Third: There was a causal connection between [describe challenged activity] and
12 [plaintiff’s] [describe plaintiff’s protected activity].

13 [[**Alternative One:**] Concerning the first element, [plaintiff] need not prove the
14 merits of [his/her] [describe plaintiff’s activity], but only that [he/she] was acting under a
15 reasonable,⁶ good faith belief that [plaintiff’s] [or someone else’s] right to be free from racial
16 discrimination was violated.] [[**Alternative Two:**] Concerning the first element, [plaintiff] must
17 prove that [plaintiff’s] [or someone else’s] right to be free from racial discrimination was violated.
18 And plaintiff must also prove that [he/she] was acting under a reasonable,⁷ good faith belief that
19 such a violation had occurred.] [Important: See Comment for a discussion of the choice between
20 these two versions.]

21 Concerning the second element, the term “materially adverse” means that [plaintiff] must
22 show [describe alleged retaliatory activity] was serious enough that it well might have discouraged
23 a reasonable worker from [describe plaintiff’s protected activity]. [The activity need not be related
24 to the workplace or to [plaintiff’s] employment.]

25 Concerning the third element, that of causal connection, that connection may be shown in

⁶ See the Comment for a discussion of the allocation of responsibility for determining the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief.

⁷ See the Comment for a discussion of the allocation of responsibility for determining the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief.

6.1.6 Retaliation

26 many ways. For example, you may or may not find that there is a sufficient connection through
27 timing, that is [defendant(s)] action followed shortly after [defendant(s)] became aware of
28 [plaintiff’s] [describe activity]. Causation is, however, not necessarily ruled out by a more
29 extended passage of time. Causation may or may not be proven by antagonism shown toward
30 [plaintiff] or a change in demeanor toward [plaintiff].

31 Ultimately, you must decide whether [plaintiff’s] [protected activity] had a determinative
32 effect on [describe alleged retaliatory activity]. “Determinative effect” means that if not for
33 [plaintiff’s] [protected activity], [describe alleged retaliatory activity] would not have occurred.

34

35 **Comment**

36 Unlike Title VII, Section 1981 does not contain a specific statutory provision prohibiting
37 retaliation. But the Supreme Court has held that retaliation claims are cognizable under Section
38 1981 despite the absence of specific statutory language. *CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries*, 553 U.S.
39 442 (2008). And the Third Circuit has indicated that the legal standards for a retaliation claim
40 under Section 1981 are generally the same as those applicable to a Title VII retaliation claim. *See*,
41 *e.g.*, *Cardenas v. Massey*, 269 F.3d 251, 263 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[T]o establish a *prima facie*
42 retaliation claim under Title VII [or] § 1981 ... , [a plaintiff] must show: (1) that he engaged in a
43 protected activity; (2) that he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that there was a
44 causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action”); *Khair v.*
45 *Campbell Soup Co.*, 893 F. Supp. 316, 335-36 (D.N.J. 1995) (noting that with respect to retaliation
46 claims, “The Civil Rights Act of 1991 extended § 1981 to the reaches of Title VII.”).

47 Where the plaintiff seeks recovery under both Title VII and Section 1981 for retaliation,
48 it may be possible to use this instruction for both causes of action.⁸ It should be noted, however,
49 that a claim under Section 1981 can be brought against an individual as well as the employer.
50 Therefore a plaintiff might bring a retaliation claim not only against the employer but also against
51 the employee who took the allegedly retaliatory action. It would then be appropriate to instruct the
52 jury that while it can impose liability on the individual under Section 1981, it cannot do so under
53 Title VII. Additionally, there is Third Circuit authority for the proposition that Section 1981

⁸ However, because Section 1981 does not encompass sex discrimination, a complaint of sex discrimination would not count as protected activity so as to trigger a Section 1981 retaliation claim. *See Carvalho-Grevious v. Delaware State Univ.*, 851 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Title VII and § 1981 ... are not coextensive, and to the extent that any of Dr. Grevious’s retaliation claims ... are based on Dr. Grevious’s complaints of gender discrimination, those claims are not cognizable” under Section 1981).

6.1.6 Retaliation

54 retaliation claims require proof of an additional element that does not apply to Title VII retaliation
55 claims. That proposition finds support in *Estate of Oliva ex rel. McHugh v. New Jersey*, 604 F.3d
56 788, 798 (3d Cir. 2010), and *Castleberry v. STI Group*, 863 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2017). After noting
57 the Supreme Court’s holding in *CBOCS West* “that section 1981 also encompasses ‘the claim of
58 an individual (black or white) who suffers retaliation because he has tried to help a different
59 individual, suffering direct racial discrimination, secure his § 1981 rights,’ ” *Oliva*, 604 F.3d at
60 798 (quoting *CBOCS*, 128 S. Ct. at 1958), the *Oliva* court stated: “In a retaliation case a plaintiff
61 must demonstrate that there had been an underlying section 1981 violation. *Id.*” *Oliva*, 604 F.3d
62 at 798.⁹

63 To the extent that *Oliva* requires proof of an underlying violation, that requirement departs
64 from the approach taken with respect to Title VII retaliation claims and retaliation claims under
65 similar statutory schemes. See Instruction 5.1.7 (Title VII retaliation); Instruction 8.1.5 (ADEA
66 retaliation); Instruction 9.1.7 (ADA retaliation); Instruction 10.1.4 (FMLA retaliation); Instruction
67 11.1.2 (Equal Pay Act retaliation). As of spring 2016, no other circuits had adopted such a
68 requirement for Section 1981 claims. Moreover, such a requirement appears to conflict with the
69 understanding of at least some Justices. In *CBOCS*, Justices Thomas and Scalia, dissenting from
70 the Court’s holding that Section 1981 encompasses retaliation claims, objected (inter alia) that a

⁹ The Court of Appeals, in *Oliva*, spent little time on this aspect of the case:

The record before us would justify a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Gallagher and Waldron demonstrated to Oliva how to stop, search, and, in some cases, arrest motorists without probable cause by reason of their race. Of course, that practice would violate section 1981’s guarantee that all persons are entitled to the same “full and equal benefit” of the law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). When a trooper complains about unjustified racial profiling he engages in protected activity and, accordingly, Oliva had a right to complain about such violations without fear of retaliation.

Estate of Oliva ex rel. McHugh v. New Jersey, 604 F.3d 788, 798 (3d Cir. 2010) (footnotes omitted). The Court of Appeals devoted a much lengthier discussion to questions of causation, holding ultimately that the plaintiff had failed to establish causation as to any of the allegedly retaliatory acts. See *Oliva*, 604 F.3d at 798-802.

In *Castleberry*, the court of appeals quoted the *Oliva* court’s statement about requiring an underlying violation, but then continued: “In doing so, the plaintiff ‘must have acted under a good faith, reasonable belief that a violation existed.’ ” *Castleberry v. STI Grp.*, 863 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting *Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila.*, 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 2015)). The import of *Castleberry* is unclear.

6.1.6 Retaliation

71 plaintiff “need not show that the [race] discrimination forming the basis of his complaints actually
72 occurred,” and that as a result, “the Court ‘creates an entirely new cause of action for a secondary
73 rights holder, beyond the claim of the original rights holder” *CBOCS*, 553 U.S. at 464-65
74 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting *Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed.*, 544 U.S.
75 167, 194-95 (2005) (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & Scalia & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting)).
76 The *CBOCS* majority did not explicitly respond to this facet of the dissenters’ argument.

77 *Oliva*’s statement that a Section 1981 retaliation claim requires proof of an underlying
78 Section 1981 violation may also be in some degree of tension with a prior opinion by the Court of
79 Appeals. In *Jones v. School District of Philadelphia*, 198 F.3d 403, 414-15 (3d Cir. 1999), the
80 Court of Appeals first held that the district court properly granted summary judgment on the
81 plaintiff’s race discrimination claims, and then held that plaintiff’s retaliation claims (under
82 Section 1981, Title VII, and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act) failed due to lack of
83 causation; had the *Jones* court believed that proof of an underlying violation of Section 1981 was
84 required for a Section 1981 retaliation claim, the court’s ruling on the discrimination claims would
85 have dictated a ruling for the defendant on the Section 1981 retaliation claim – yet the Court of
86 Appeals instead based its ruling (as to all three types of retaliation claims) solely on finding a lack
87 of evidence of causation.

88 Without attempting to resolve the issue, the Committee wishes to ensure that users of these
89 instructions are aware of the language in *Oliva* (also quoted in *Castleberry*)¹⁰ indicating that
90 Section 1981 retaliation claims require proof of an underlying violation. *See also, e.g., Ellis v.*
91 *Budget Maintenance, Inc.*, 25 F. Supp. 3d 749 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (holding that *Oliva* requires proof
92 of an underlying violation), *appeal dismissed* (Nov. 25, 2014).

93 The most common activities protected from retaliation under Section 1981 and Title VII
94 are: 1) opposing unlawful discrimination; 2) making a charge of employment discrimination; 3)
95 testifying, assisting or participating in any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under
96 Section 1981. See the discussion of protected activity in the Comment to Instruction 5.1.7. *See*
97 *also Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh*, 120 F.3d 1286, 1299 (3d Cir. 1997) (filing discrimination
98 complaint constitutes protected activity), *overruled on other grounds by Burlington N. & S.F. Ry.*
99 *Co. v. White*, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006); *Kachmar v. Sungard Data Sys., Inc.*, 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d
100 Cir. 1997) (advocating equal treatment was protected activity); *Aman v. Cort Furniture*, 85 F.3d
101 1074, 1085 (3d Cir. 1989) (under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision “a plaintiff need not prove
102 the merits of the underlying discrimination complaint, but only that ‘he was acting under a good
103 faith, reasonable belief that a violation existed’ ” (quoting *Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp.*, 988 F.2d 457,

¹⁰ See *supra* note 93 for a discussion of *Castleberry*.

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104 468 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting *Sumner v. United States Postal Service*, 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir.
105 1990)), *overruled on other grounds by Miller v. CIGNA Corp.*, 47 F.3d 586 (3d Cir. 1995)).

106 In accord with instructions from other circuits, Instruction 6.1.6 directs the jury to
107 determine both the good faith and the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s belief that employment
108 discrimination had occurred. *See* Fifth Circuit Committee Note to Instruction 11.6.1 (Title VII
109 retaliation); Seventh Circuit Committee Comment to Instruction 3.02 (retaliation instruction for
110 use in Title VII, § 1981, and ADEA cases); Eleventh Circuit Instruction 4.21 (Section 1981
111 retaliation); Eleventh Circuit Instruction 4.22 (retaliation claims under Title VII, ADEA, ADA,
112 and FLSA); *see also* Eighth Circuit Instruction 10.41 (retaliation claim (regarding opposition to
113 harassment or discrimination) under Title VII and other federal discrimination laws; instruction
114 uses phrase “reasonably believed”); *id.* Notes on Use, Note 5 (using phrase “reasonably and in
115 good faith believe”); *compare* Ninth Circuit Instruction & Comment 10.3 (Title VII retaliation)
116 (discussing reasonableness requirement in the comment but not in the model instruction). In cases
117 where the protected nature of the plaintiff’s activity is not in dispute, this portion of the instruction
118 can be modified and the court can simply instruct the jury that specified actions by the plaintiff
119 constituted protected activity. As noted above, there is Third Circuit authority for the proposition
120 that Section 1981 retaliation claims – unlike retaliation claims under a number of other federal
121 statutes – require proof of an underlying violation. Instruction 6.1.6 offers two alternative versions
122 of the instruction on protected activity. The first alternative tracks the approach taken in
123 Instructions 5.1.7, 8.1.5, 9.1.7, 10.1.4, and 11.1.2, and states that the plaintiff need not prove an
124 underlying Section 1981 violation. The second alternative implements *Oliva*’s statement that a
125 Section 1981 retaliation claim requires proof of an underlying Section 1981 violation; this
126 alternative instructs that the plaintiff must prove both that there was such a violation and that
127 plaintiff was acting under a reasonable, good faith belief that such a violation had occurred. If the
128 court employs the second alternative, it may wish to instruct the jury that if the jury finds an
129 underlying Section 1981 violation, then it should also find that the plaintiff’s belief (that such a
130 violation had occurred) was reasonable.

131 *Determinative effect*

132 Instruction 6.1.6 requires the plaintiff to show that the plaintiff’s protected activity had a
133 determinative effect on the allegedly retaliatory activity. This is the standard mandated for Section
134 1981 discrimination cases outside the context of retaliation after *Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of*
135 *African American-Owned Media*, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020). *See* Instruction 6.1.2; *see also Estate of*
136 *Oliva ex rel. McHugh v. New Jersey*, 604 F.3d 788, 798 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying the pretext
137 framework to Section 1981 retaliation claims); *Carvalho-Grevious v. Delaware State University*,
138 851 F.3d 249, 258 (3d Cir. 2017) (basing its analysis on the premise that the determinative-effect
139 requirement applied to both the plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claims and her Section 1981
140 retaliation claims).

6.1.6 Retaliation

141

142 *Standard for Actionable Retaliation*

143 The Supreme Court in *Burlington N. & S.F. Ry. v. White*, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006), held that
144 a cause of action for retaliation under Title VII lies whenever the employer responds to protected
145 activity in such a way “that a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action
146 materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker
147 from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” (citations omitted). The Court in *White*
148 also held that retaliation need not be job-related to be actionable under Title VII. In doing so, the
149 Court rejected authority from the Third Circuit (and others) requiring that the plaintiff suffer an
150 adverse employment action in order to recover for retaliation. Because the standards for retaliation
151 claims under Section 1981 have been equated to those applicable to Title VII, the instruction is
152 written to comply with the standard for actionable retaliation in *White*. For a more complete
153 discussion of *White*, see the Comment to Instruction 5.1.7.

154 *Retaliation for another’s protected activity*

155 The Supreme Court held in *Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP*, 131 S. Ct. 863
156 (2011), that Title VII not only bars retaliation against the employee who engaged in the protected
157 activity, it also bars retaliation against another employee if the circumstances are such that the
158 retaliation against that employee might well dissuade a reasonable worker from engaging in
159 protected activity. *See id.* at 868. The *Thompson* Court did not discuss whether its holding extends
160 to retaliation claims under other statutory schemes such as Section 1981. The *Thompson* Court’s
161 holding that the third-party retaliation victim can sometimes assert a retaliation claim under Title
162 VII rested on the Court’s analysis of the specific statutory language of Title VII. *See Thompson*,
163 131 S. Ct. at 869 (analyzing language in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) stating that “a civil action may
164 be brought ... by the person claiming to be aggrieved”). Because Section 1981 does not contain
165 similar statutory language, it is unclear whether that holding would extend to claims under Section
166 1981. For further discussion of *Thompson*, see Comment 5.1.7.

6.1.7 Municipal Liability – No Instruction

6.1.7 Elements of a Section 1981 Claim — Municipal Liability — No Instruction

Comment

Section 1981 applies against employers acting under color of State law. *See* 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c). Where a government employee brings a claim of racial discrimination in employment, there can be an overlap of Section 1981 and Section 1983 protections. In *Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist.*, 491 U.S. 701, 731 (1989), the Supreme Court held that the remedial provisions of Section 1983 constituted the exclusive federal remedy for violations of rights enumerated in Section 1981 for actions under color of State law. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Section 1981 after the decision in *Jett*, however; and the circuits have split over whether that Act established an independent private cause of action under Section 1981 against employers acting under color of state law for acts of racial discrimination. *See, e.g., Federation of African American Contractors v. City of Oakland*, 96 F.3d 1204, 1214 (9th Cir.1996) (Civil Rights Act of 1991 restored a private right of action under Section 1981 for racial discrimination in employment under color of state law); *Dennis v. County of Fairfax*, 55 F.3d 151, 156 (4th Cir.1995) (section 1983 continues as the exclusive federal remedy for rights guaranteed in section 1981 by state actors); *Johnson v. City of Fort Lauderdale*, 114 F.3d 1089 (11th Cir.1997) (following Fourth Circuit view).

The Third Circuit has “join[ed] five of [its] sister circuits in holding that no implied private right of action exists against state actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.” *McGovern v. City of Philadelphia*, 554 F.3d 114, 122 (3d Cir. 2009).¹¹ Accordingly, no municipal-liability instruction is provided here. A claim against a government actor for a violation of Section 1981 can in appropriate circumstances be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For discussion of Section 1983 claims, see generally Chapter 4.

¹¹ As the quote in the text indicates, the *McGovern* court described its determination on this point as a holding. The *McGovern* court also noted another ground for its resolution of the case: “Even if we were to recognize a cause of action under § 1981, McGovern's claim against the City was appropriately dismissed for an independent reason: he did not allege that the discrimination he suffered was pursuant to an official policy or custom of the City.” *McGovern*, 554 F.3d at 121.

6.2.1 Section 1981 Definitions — Race

Model

You must determine whether the discrimination, if any, was based on race, as it is only racial discrimination that is prohibited by this statute under which [plaintiff] seeks relief. The parties dispute whether [plaintiff] is a member of a “race” entitled to the protections of the statute. You are instructed that the statute is intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics. Such discrimination is racial discrimination that Congress intended to forbid, even if it would not be classified as racial in terms of modern usage or scientific theory.

Comment

42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits racial discrimination. In *St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji*, 481 U.S. 604, 609-10 (1987), the Court considered whether a person of Arab descent was entitled to the protections of Section 1981. Defendants argued that the plaintiff was a Caucasian as that term is commonly understood in modern usage. But the Court found that the question of race had to be determined by reference to a different time period, i.e., the 19th Century, when Section 1981 was enacted. “Plainly, all those who might be deemed Caucasian today were not thought to be of the same race at the time § 1981 became law.” *Id.* The Court elaborated on the proper inquiry as follows:

In the middle years of the 19th century, dictionaries commonly referred to race as a “continued series of descendants from a parent who is called the stock,” N. Webster, *An American Dictionary of the English Language* 666 (New York 1830) (emphasis in original), “the lineage of a family,” 2 N. Webster, *A Dictionary of the English Language* 411 (New Haven 1841), or “descendants of a common ancestor,” J. Donald, *Chambers’ Etymological Dictionary of the English Language* 415 (London 1871). . . . It was not until the 20th century that dictionaries began referring to the Caucasian, Mongolian, and Negro races, 8 *The Century Dictionary and Cyclopaedia* 4926 (1911), or to race as involving divisions of mankind based upon different physical characteristics. Webster’s *Collegiate Dictionary* 794 (3d ed. 1916). Even so, modern dictionaries still include among the definitions of race “a family, tribe, people, or nation belonging to the same stock.” Webster’s *Third New International Dictionary* 1870 (1971); Webster’s *Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary* 969 (1986).

Encyclopedias of the 19th century also described race in terms of ethnic groups,

6.2.1 Race

34 which is a narrower concept of race than petitioners urge. Encyclopedia Americana in
35 1858, for example, referred to various races such as Finns, vol. 5, p. 123, gypsies, 6 id., at
36 123, Basques, 1 id., at 602, and Hebrews, 6 id., at 209. The 1863 version of the New
37 American Cyclopaedia divided the Arabs into a number of subsidiary races, vol. 1, p. 739;
38 represented the Hebrews as of the Semitic race, 9 id., at 27, and identified numerous other
39 groups as constituting races, including Swedes, 15 id., at 216, Norwegians, 12 id., at 410,
40 Germans, 8 id., at 200, Greeks, 8 id., at 438, Finns, 7 id., at 513, Italians, 9 id., at 644-645
41 (referring to mixture of different races), Spanish, 14 id., at 804, Mongolians, 11 id., at 651,
42 Russians, 14 id., at 226, and the like. The Ninth edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica also
43 referred to Arabs, vol. 2, p. 245 (1878), Jews, 13 id., at 685 (1881), and other ethnic groups
44 such as Germans, 10 id., at 473 (1879), Hungarians, 12 id., at 365 (1880), and Greeks, 11
45 id., at 83 (1880), as separate races.

46 These dictionary and encyclopedic sources are somewhat diverse, but it is clear that
47 they do not support the claim that for the purposes of § 1981, Arabs, Englishmen, Germans,
48 and certain other ethnic groups are to be considered a single race. We would expect the
49 legislative history of § 1981 . . . to reflect this common understanding, which it surely does.
50 The debates are replete with references to the Scandinavian races, Cong. Globe, 39th
51 Cong., 1st Sess., 499 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Cowan), as well as the Chinese, id., at 523
52 (remarks of Sen. Davis), Latin, id., at 238 (remarks of Rep. Kasson during debate of home
53 rule for the District of Columbia), Spanish, id., at 251 (remarks of Sen. Davis during debate
54 of District of Columbia suffrage), and Anglo-Saxon races, id., at 542 (remarks of Rep.
55 Dawson). Jews, *ibid.*, Mexicans, see *ibid.* (remarks of Rep. Dawson), blacks, *passim*, and
56 Mongolians, id., at 498 (remarks of Sen. Cowan), were similarly categorized. Gypsies were
57 referred to as a race. *Ibid.* (remarks of Sen. Cowan). Likewise, the Germans. . . .

58 Based on the history of § 1981, we have little trouble in concluding that Congress
59 intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected
60 to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics. Such
61 discrimination is racial discrimination that Congress intended § 1981 to forbid, whether or
62 not it would be classified as racial in terms of modern scientific theory. The Court of
63 Appeals was thus quite right in holding that § 1981, "at a minimum," reaches discrimination
64 against an individual "because he or she is genetically part of an ethnically and
65 physiognomically distinctive subgrouping of homo sapiens." It is clear from our holding,
66 however, that a distinctive physiognomy is not essential to qualify for § 1981 protection.
67 If respondent on remand can prove that he was subjected to intentional discrimination
68 based on the fact that he was born an Arab, rather than solely on the place or nation of his
69 origin, or his religion, he will have made out a case under § 1981.

70 Note that Section 1981 does not prohibit racial discrimination that is solely on the basis of

6.2.1 Race

71 location of birth (as distinct from ethnic or genetic characteristics). See *Bennun v. Rutgers State*
72 *Univ.*, 941 F.2d 154, 172 (3d Cir. 1991) ("Section 1981 does not mention national origin"); *King*
73 *v. Township of E. Lampeter*, 17 F. Supp. 2d 394, 417 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (holding that disparate
74 treatment on the basis of national origin was not within the scope of Section 1981). While the line
75 between race and national origin may in some cases be vague, it must be remembered that the
76 Court in St. Francis College intended that the term "race" be applied broadly. Thus, in *Schouten v.*
77 *CSX Transp., Inc.*, 58 F. Supp. 2d 614, 617-18 (E.D. Pa. 1999), the court declared that "for
78 purposes of Section 1981, race is to be interpreted broadly and may encompass ancestry or ethnic
79 characteristics."

80

6.2.2 Hostile or Abusive Work Environment

6.2.2 Section 1981 Definitions — Hostile or Abusive Work Environment

Model

In determining whether a work environment is "hostile" you must look at all of the circumstances, which may include:

- The total physical environment of [plaintiff's] work area.
- The degree and type of language and insult that filled the environment before and after [plaintiff] arrived.
- The reasonable expectations of [plaintiff] upon entering the environment.
- The frequency of the offensive conduct.
- The severity of the conduct.
- The effect of the working environment on [plaintiff's] mental and emotional well-being.
- Whether the conduct was unwelcome, that is, conduct [plaintiff] regarded as unwanted or unpleasant.
- Whether the conduct was pervasive.
- Whether the conduct was directed toward [plaintiff].
- Whether the conduct was physically threatening or humiliating.
- Whether the conduct was merely a tasteless remark.
- Whether the conduct unreasonably interfered with [plaintiff's] work performance.

Conduct that amounts only to ordinary socializing in the workplace, such as occasional horseplay, occasional use of abusive language, tasteless jokes, and occasional teasing, does not constitute an abusive or hostile work environment. A hostile work environment can be found only if there is extreme conduct amounting to a material change in the terms and conditions of employment. Moreover, isolated incidents, unless extremely serious, will not amount to a hostile work environment.

It is not enough that the work environment was generally harsh, unfriendly, unpleasant,

6.2.2 Hostile or Abusive Work Environment

26 crude or vulgar to all employees. In order to find a hostile work environment, you must find that
27 [plaintiff] was harassed because of [race]. The harassing conduct may, but need not be racially-
28 based in nature. Rather, its defining characteristic is that the harassment complained of was linked
29 to [plaintiff's] [race]. The key question is whether [plaintiff], as a [plaintiff's race], was subjected
30 to harsh employment conditions to which [those other than members of the plaintiff's race] were
31 not.

32 It is important to understand that, in determining whether a hostile work environment
33 existed at the [employer's workplace] you must consider the evidence from the perspective of a
34 reasonable [member of plaintiff's race] in the same position. That is, you must determine whether
35 a reasonable [member of plaintiff's race] would have been offended or harmed by the conduct in
36 question. You must evaluate the total circumstances and determine whether the alleged harassing
37 behavior could be objectively classified as the kind of behavior that would seriously affect the
38 psychological or emotional well-being of a reasonable [member of plaintiff's race]. The reasonable
39 [member of plaintiff's race] is simply one of normal sensitivity and emotional make-up.

40

41 **Comment**

42 This instruction can be used if the court wishes to provide a more detailed instruction on
43 what constitutes a hostile work environment than those set forth in Instructions 6.1.3 and 6.1.4.
44 This instruction is substantively identical to the definition of hostile work environment in Title VII
45 cases. *See* Instruction 5.2.1. The standards for a hostile work environment claim are identical under
46 Title VII and Section 1981. *See, e.g., Verdin v. Weeks Marine Inc.*, 124 Fed.Appx. 92, 94 (3d Cir.
47 2005) (“Regarding Verdin's hostile work environment claim, the same standard used under Title
48 VII applies under Section 1981.”); *Ocasio v. Lehigh Valley Family Health Center*, 92 Fed.Appx.
49 876, 879-80 (3d Cir. 2004) (“As amended by the 1991 Civil Rights Act, § 1981 now encompasses
50 hostile work environment claims, and we apply the same standards as in a similar Title VII
51 claim.”). Where the plaintiff seeks recovery under both Title VII and Section 1981, this instruction
52 may be given for both causes of action.

53 For further commentary on the definition of a hostile work environment, see Instruction
54 5.2.1.

6.2.3 Section 1981 Definitions — Constructive Discharge

Model

In this case, to show that [he/she] was subjected to an adverse “tangible employment action,” [plaintiff] claims that [he/she] was forced to resign due to [name’s] racially discriminatory conduct. Such a forced resignation, if proven, is called a “constructive discharge.” To prove that [he/she] was subjected to a constructive discharge, [plaintiff] must prove that working conditions became so intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to resign.

Comment

The court of appeals has applied its Title VII constructive-discharge precedent in the context of Section 1981 claims. *See Jones v. School Dist. of Philadelphia*, 198 F.3d 403, 412 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing *Goss v. Exxon Office Systems Co.*, 747 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1984)). Accordingly, this instruction is substantively identical to the constructive discharge instruction for Title VII actions. *See* Instruction 5.2.2.

This instruction can be used when the plaintiff was not fired but resigned, and claims that she nonetheless suffered an adverse employment action because she was constructively discharged due to an adverse action or actions that were sanctioned by her employer. This instruction is designed for use with any of Instructions 6.1.2 through 6.1.3. Assuming that the Title VII framework concerning employer liability for harassment applies to Section 1981 actions, the employer’s ability to assert an *Ellerth / Faragher* affirmative defense in a constructive discharge case will depend on whether the constructive discharge resulted from actions that were sanctioned by the employer. *See Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders*, 542 U.S. 129, 140-41 (2004) (“[A]n employer does not have recourse to the *Ellerth/ Faragher* affirmative defense when a supervisor's official act precipitates the constructive discharge; absent such a ‘tangible employment action,’ however, the defense is available to the employer whose supervisors are charged with harassment.”); *see also* Comment 5.1.5.

6.3.1 Bona Fide Occupational Qualification

1 **6.3.1 Section 1981 Defenses — Bona Fide Occupational Qualification**

2

3 *No Instruction*

4

5 **Comment**

6 There is no BFOQ defense in racial discrimination cases. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1). *See*
7 *Ferrill v. Parker Group*, 168 F.3d 468, 475 (11th Cir.1999) (no BFOQ defense to race-matched
8 telemarketing or polling).

1 **6.3.2 Section 1981 Defenses — Bona Fide Seniority System**

2

3 *No Instruction*

4

5 **Comment**

6 Title VII provides that “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall
7 not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of
8 compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide
9 seniority . . . system, . . . provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to
10 discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).
11 In *Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc.*, 490 U.S. 900, 908-09 (1989), *superseded by statute on*
12 *other grounds*, Pub. L. No. 102-166, Title I, § 112, 105 Stat. 1079, codified as amended at 42
13 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(2), the Court stated that the plaintiff has the burden of proving intentional
14 discrimination and held that, as applied to seniority systems, the plaintiff must prove that the
15 seniority system is a means of intentional discrimination. Thus the existence of a bona fide
16 seniority system is not an affirmative defense; rather it is simply an aspect of the plaintiff’s burden
17 of proving discrimination. The standards for proving intentional discrimination are the same for
18 Title VII and Section 1981. *See Gunby v. Pennsylvania Electric Co.*, 840 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1988).
19 Accordingly, no instruction is included for any affirmative defense for a bona fide seniority
20 system.

6.4.1 Compensatory Damages – General Instructions

6.4.1 Section 1981 Damages — Compensatory Damages — General Instruction

Model

I am now going to instruct you on damages. Just because I am instructing you on how to award damages does not mean that I have any opinion on whether or not [defendant] should be held liable.

If you find by a preponderance of the evidence that [defendant] intentionally discriminated against [plaintiff] by [describe conduct], then you must consider the issue of compensatory damages. You must award [plaintiff] an amount that will fairly compensate [him/her] for any injury [he/she] actually sustained as a result of [defendant's] conduct. The damages that you award must be fair compensation, no more and no less. The award of compensatory damages is meant to put [plaintiff] in the position [he/she] would have occupied if the discrimination had not occurred. [Plaintiff] has the burden of proving damages by a preponderance of the evidence.

[Plaintiff] must show that the injury would not have occurred without [defendant's] act [or omission]. Plaintiff must also show that [defendant's] act [or omission] played a substantial part in bringing about the injury, and that the injury was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of [defendant's] act [or omission]. This test — a substantial part in bringing about the injury — is to be distinguished from the test you must employ in determining whether [defendant's] actions were motivated by discrimination. In other words, even assuming that [defendant's] actions [or omissions] were motivated by discrimination, [plaintiff] is not entitled to damages for an injury unless [defendant's] discriminatory actions [or omissions] actually played a substantial part in bringing about that injury.

[There can be more than one cause of an injury. To find that [defendant's] act caused [plaintiff's] injury, you need not find that [defendant's] act was the nearest cause, either in time or space. However, if [plaintiff's] injury was caused by a later, independent event that intervened between [defendant's] act [or omission] and [plaintiff's] injury, [defendant] is not liable unless the injury was reasonably foreseeable by [defendant].]

In determining the amount of any damages that you decide to award, you should be guided by common sense. You must use sound judgment in fixing an award of damages, drawing reasonable inferences from the facts in evidence. You may not award damages based on sympathy, speculation, or guesswork.

You may award damages for any pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, or loss of enjoyment of life that [plaintiff] experienced as a consequence of [defendant's] [allegedly]

6.4.1 Compensatory Damages – General Instructions

34 unlawful act or omission]. No evidence of the monetary value of such intangible things as pain
35 and suffering has been, or need be, introduced into evidence. There is no exact standard for fixing
36 the compensation to be awarded for these elements of damage. Any award you make should be
37 fair in light of the evidence presented at the trial.

38 I instruct you that in awarding compensatory damages, you are not to award damages for
39 the amount of wages that [plaintiff] would have earned, either in the past or in the future, if [he/she]
40 had continued in employment with [defendant]. These elements of recovery of wages that
41 [plaintiff] would have received from [defendant] are called “back pay” and “front pay”. [Under
42 the applicable law, the determination of “back pay” and “front pay” is for the court.] [“Back pay”
43 and “front pay” are to be awarded separately under instructions that I will soon give you, and any
44 amounts for “back pay” and “front pay” are to be entered separately on the verdict form.]

45 You may award damages for monetary losses that [plaintiff] may suffer in the future as a
46 result of [defendant’s] [allegedly unlawful act or omission]. [For example, you may award
47 damages for loss of earnings resulting from any harm to [plaintiff’s] reputation that was suffered
48 as a result of [defendant’s] [allegedly unlawful act or omission]. Where a victim of discrimination
49 has been terminated by an employer, and has sued that employer for discrimination, [he/she] may
50 find it more difficult to be employed in the future, or she may have to take a job that pays less than
51 if the discrimination had not occurred. That element of damages is distinct from the amount of
52 wages [plaintiff] would have earned in the future from [defendant] if [he/she] had retained her
53 job.]

54 As I instructed you previously, [plaintiff] has the burden of proving damages by a
55 preponderance of the evidence. But the law does not require that [plaintiff] prove the amount of
56 [his/her] losses with mathematical precision; it requires only as much definiteness and accuracy as
57 circumstances permit.

58 [You are instructed that [plaintiff] has a duty under the law to "mitigate" [his/her]
59 damages--that means that [plaintiff] must take advantage of any reasonable opportunity that may
60 have existed under the circumstances to reduce or minimize the loss or damage caused by
61 [defendant]. It is [defendant's] burden to prove that [plaintiff] has failed to mitigate. So if
62 [defendant] persuades you by a preponderance of the evidence that [plaintiff] failed to take
63 advantage of an opportunity that was reasonably available to [him/her], then you must reduce the
64 amount of [plaintiff’s] damages by the amount that could have been reasonably obtained if [he/she]
65 had taken advantage of such an opportunity.]

66 [In assessing damages, you must not consider attorney fees or the costs of litigating this
67 case. Attorney fees and costs, if relevant at all, are for the court and not the jury to determine.
68 Therefore, attorney fees and costs should play no part in your calculation of any damages.]

6.4.1 Compensatory Damages – General Instructions

69

70 **Comment**

71 Compensatory damages are recoverable under Section 1981. *See Johnson v. Railway*
72 *Express Agency*, 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975) (individual who establishes a cause of action under
73 Section 1981 is entitled to both equitable and legal relief, including compensatory, and under
74 certain circumstances, punitive damages).

75 Compensatory damages may include emotional distress and humiliation as well as out-of-
76 pocket costs. *See, e.g., Gunby v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co.*, 840 F.2d 1108, 1121-22 (3d Cir.1988)
77 (“General compensatory damages are available under §1981, and such damages may include
78 compensation for emotional pain and suffering.”). “The plaintiff must present evidence of actual
79 injury, however, before recovering compensatory damages for mental distress.” *Id.*

80 There is a right to jury trial for compensatory damages under Section 1981. *Laskaris v.*
81 *Thornburgh*, 733 F.2d 260, 263 (3d Cir. 1984). However, compensatory damages are to be
82 distinguished from awards of front pay and back pay, which constitute equitable relief. *Id.* (noting
83 that a claim for back pay is one for equitable relief, but that the plaintiff nonetheless had a right to
84 jury trial on his claims for compensatory damages). Where claims for back pay and front pay are
85 brought with claims for compensatory damages, the trial court may wish to use the jury as an
86 adviser on the amount to be awarded for back pay or front pay; alternatively, the parties may wish
87 to stipulate that the jury’s determination of back pay and front pay will be binding. In many cases
88 it is commonplace for back pay issues to be submitted to the jury. The court may think it prudent
89 to consult with counsel on whether the issues of back pay or front pay should be submitted to the
90 jury (on either an advisory or stipulated basis) or is to be left to the court’s determination without
91 reference to the jury.

92 For further comment on compensatory damages, see the Comment to Instruction 5.4.1.

93 *Attorney Fees and Costs*

94 There appears to be no uniform practice regarding the use of an instruction that warns the
95 jury against speculation on attorney fees and costs. In *Collins v. Alco Parking Corp.*, 448 F.3d
96 652 (3d Cir. 2006), the district court gave the following instruction: “You are instructed that if
97 plaintiff wins on his claim, he may be entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs over and
98 above what you award as damages. It is my duty to decide whether to award attorney fees and
99 costs, and if so, how much. Therefore, attorney fees and costs should play no part in your
100 calculation of any damages.” *Id.* at 656-57. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff had not
101 properly objected to the instruction, and, reviewing for plain error, found none: “We need not

6.4.1 Compensatory Damages – General Instructions

102 and do not decide now whether a district court commits error by informing a jury about the
103 availability of attorney fees in an ADEA case. Assuming *arguendo* that an error occurred, such
104 error is not plain, for two reasons.” *Id.* at 657. First, “it is not ‘obvious’ or ‘plain’ that an
105 instruction directing the jury *not* to consider attorney fees” is irrelevant or prejudicial; “it is at
106 least arguable that a jury tasked with computing damages might, absent information that the
107 Court has discretion to award attorney fees at a later stage, seek to compensate a sympathetic
108 plaintiff for the expense of litigation.” *Id.* Second, it is implausible “that the jury, in order to
109 eliminate the chance that Collins might be awarded attorney fees, took the disproportionate step
110 of returning a verdict against him even though it believed he was the victim of age
111 discrimination, notwithstanding the District Court's clear instructions to the contrary.” *Id.*; *see*
112 *also id.* at 658 (distinguishing *Fisher v. City of Memphis*, 234 F.3d 312, 319 (6th Cir. 2000), and
113 *Brooks v. Cook*, 938 F.2d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 1991)).

1 **6.4.2 Section 1981 Damages — Punitive Damages**

2 **Model**

3 [Plaintiff] claims the acts of [defendant] were done with malice or reckless indifference to
4 [plaintiff's] federally protected rights and that as a result there should be an award of what are
5 called “punitive” damages. A jury may award punitive damages to punish a defendant, or to deter
6 the defendant and others like the defendant from committing such conduct in the future. [Where
7 appropriate, the jury may award punitive damages even if the plaintiff suffered no actual injury,
8 and so receives nominal rather than compensatory damages.]

9

10 **For Individual Defendant:**

11 [An award of punitive damages is permissible against [name(s) of individual defendant(s)]
12 in this case only if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that [name(s) of individual
13 defendant(s)] personally acted with malice or reckless indifference to [plaintiff's] federally
14 protected rights. An action is with malice if a person knows that it violates the federal law
15 prohibiting discrimination and does it anyway. An action is with reckless indifference if taken with
16 knowledge that it may violate the law.]

17

18 **For Employer-Defendant:**

19 [However, punitive damages cannot be imposed on an employer where its employees acted
20 contrary to the employer's own good faith efforts to comply with the law by implementing policies
21 and procedures designed to prevent unlawful discrimination in the workplace.

22 An award of punitive damages against [employer] is therefore permissible in this case only
23 if you find by a preponderance of the evidence that a management official of [defendant]
24 personally acted with malice or reckless indifference to [plaintiff's] federally protected rights. An
25 action is with malice if a person knows that it violates the federal law prohibiting discrimination
26 and does it anyway. An action is with reckless indifference if taken with knowledge that it may
27 violate the law.

28

29 **[For use where the defendant-employer raises a jury question on good-faith attempt**
30 **to comply with the law:**

6.4.2 Punitive Damages

31

32 But even if you make a finding that there has been an act of discrimination with malice or
33 reckless disregard of [plaintiff's] federal rights, you cannot award punitive damages if [defendant-
34 employer] proves by a preponderance of the evidence that it made a good-faith attempt to comply
35 with the law, by adopting policies and procedures designed to prevent unlawful discrimination
36 such as that suffered by [plaintiff].]

37

38 An award of punitive damages is discretionary; that is, if you find that the legal
39 requirements for punitive damages are satisfied [and that [employer-defendant] has not proved that
40 it made a good-faith attempt to comply with the law] then you may decide to award punitive
41 damages, or you may decide not to award them. I will now discuss some considerations that should
42 guide your exercise of this discretion.

43 If you have found the elements permitting punitive damages, as discussed in this
44 instruction, then you should consider the purposes of punitive damages. The purposes of punitive
45 damages are to punish a defendant for a malicious or reckless disregard of federal rights, or to
46 deter a defendant and others like the defendant from doing similar things in the future, or both.
47 Thus, you may consider whether to award punitive damages to punish [defendant(s)]. You should
48 also consider whether actual damages standing alone are sufficient to deter or prevent
49 [defendant(s)] from again performing any wrongful acts that may have been performed. Finally,
50 you should consider whether an award of punitive damages in this case is likely to deter others
51 from performing wrongful acts similar to those [defendant(s)] may have committed.

52 If you decide to award punitive damages, then you should also consider the purposes of
53 punitive damages in deciding the amount of punitive damages to award. That is, in deciding the
54 amount of punitive damages, you should consider the degree to which [defendant(s)] should be
55 punished for the wrongful conduct at issue in this case, and the degree to which an award of one
56 sum or another will deter [defendant(s)] or others from committing similar wrongful acts in the
57 future.

58 [The extent to which a particular amount of money will adequately punish a defendant, and
59 the extent to which a particular amount will adequately deter or prevent future misconduct, may
60 depend upon a defendant's financial resources. Therefore, if you find that punitive damages
61 should be awarded against [defendant(s)], you may consider the financial resources of
62 [defendant(s)] in fixing the amount of those damages.]

63

6.4.2 Punitive Damages

64 **Comment**

65 In *Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.*, 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975), the Supreme Court
66 held that a plaintiff in a Section 1981 action is entitled to punitive damages "under certain
67 circumstances." Unlike Title VII, which places caps on punitive damage awards, there is no such
68 statutory cap for Section 1981 actions.

69 In *Kolstad v. American Dental Association*, 527 U.S. 526, 534-35 (1999), the Supreme
70 Court held that plaintiffs are not required to show egregious or outrageous discrimination in order
71 to recover punitive damages under Title VII. The Court read 42 U.S.C. § 1981a to mean, however,
72 that proof of intentional discrimination is not enough in itself to justify an award of punitive
73 damages, because the statute suggests a congressional intent to authorize punitive awards "in only
74 a subset of cases involving intentional discrimination." Therefore, "an employer must at least
75 discriminate in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law to be liable in
76 punitive damages." *Kolstad*, 527 U.S. at 536. The Court further held that an employer may be held
77 liable for a punitive damage award for the intentionally discriminatory conduct of its employee
78 only if the employee served the employer in a managerial capacity, committed the intentional
79 discrimination at issue while acting in the scope of employment, and the employer did not engage
80 in good faith efforts to comply with federal law. *Kolstad*, 527 U.S. at 545-46. In determining
81 whether an employee is in a managerial capacity, a court should review the type of authority that
82 the employer has given to the employee and the amount of discretion that the employee has in
83 what is done and how it is accomplished. *Id.*, 527 U.S. at 543.

84 The *Kolstad* decision construed a 1991 amendment to Title VII that made punitive
85 damages available in Title VII actions for the first time. Thus it is not explicitly applicable to
86 Section 1981 actions, as to which punitive damages have always been available. Nonetheless, the
87 analysis in *Kolstad* seems readily applicable to discrimination claims brought under Section 1981.
88 As with Title VII, the plaintiff should do something more than prove race discrimination to justify
89 punitive damages; otherwise every violation of Section 1981 would automatically qualify for a
90 punitive damages award. Similarly, punitive damages in a Section 1981 action should not be found
91 against an employer solely on the basis of respondeat superior.

92 Accordingly, the pattern instruction incorporates the *Kolstad* standards in the same fashion
93 as the instruction for Title VII actions. See Instruction 5.4.2. See also *Ross v. Kansas City Power
94 & Light Co.*, 293 F.3d 1041, 1048 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that the *Kolstad* standards apply to an
95 award of punitive damages under Section 1981); *Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc.*, 206 F.3d
96 431, 441 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that "any case law construing the punitive damages standard set
97 forth in § 1981a, for example *Kolstad*, is equally applicable to clarify the common law punitive
98 damages standard with respect to a § 1981 claim"); *Swinton v. Potomac Corp.*, 270 F.3d 794, 817
99 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying *Kolstad* in a Section 1981 action and affirming a punitive damages award

6.4.2 Punitive Damages

100 of \$1,000,000 against an employer, where highly offensive language was directed at the plaintiff,
101 coupled by the abject failure of the employer to combat the harassment).

102 However, the instruction differs in one important respect from that to be employed in Title
103 VII cases: it takes account of the possibility that an employee might be subject to punitive damages
104 under Section 1981. In contrast, only employers can be liable under Title VII. Unlike employers,
105 employees would not be entitled to a defense for good faith attempt to comply with federal law.

106 The Supreme Court has imposed some due process limits on both the size of punitive
107 damages awards and the process by which those awards are determined and reviewed. In
108 performing the substantive due process review of the size of punitive awards, a court must consider
109 three factors: “the degree of reprehensibility of” the defendant’s conduct; “the disparity between
110 the harm or potential harm suffered by” the plaintiff and the punitive award; and the difference
111 between the punitive award “and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.”
112 *BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore*, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996).

113 For a complete discussion of the applicability of the *Gore* factors to a jury instruction on
114 punitive damages, see the Comment to Instruction 4.8.3.

6.4.3 Back Pay – For Advisory or Stipulated Jury

6.4.3 Section 1981 Damages — Back Pay— For Advisory or Stipulated Jury

Model

If you find that [defendant-employer] intentionally discriminated against [plaintiff] in [describe employment action] [plaintiff], then you must determine the amount of damages that [defendant's] actions have caused [plaintiff]. [Plaintiff] has the burden of proving damages by a preponderance of the evidence.

You may award as actual damages an amount that reasonably compensates [plaintiff] for any lost wages and benefits, taking into consideration any increases in salary and benefits, including pension, that [plaintiff] would have received from [defendant] had [plaintiff] not been the subject of [defendant's] intentional discrimination.

Back pay damages, if any, apply from the time [plaintiff] was [describe adverse employment action] until the date of your verdict.

You must reduce any award by the amount of the expenses that [plaintiff] would have incurred in making those earnings.

If you award back pay, you are instructed to deduct from the back pay figure whatever wages [plaintiff] has obtained from other employment during this period. However, please note that you should not deduct social security benefits, unemployment compensation and pension benefits from an award of back pay.

[You are further instructed that [plaintiff] has a duty to mitigate [his/her] damages--that is [plaintiff] is required to make reasonable efforts under the circumstances to reduce [his/her] damages. It is [defendant's] burden to prove that [plaintiff] has failed to mitigate. So if [defendant] persuades you, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [plaintiff] failed to obtain substantially equivalent job opportunities that were reasonably available to [him/ her], you must reduce the award of damages by the amount of the wages that [plaintiff] reasonably would have earned if [he/she] had obtained those opportunities.]

[Add the following instruction if the employer claims “after-acquired evidence” of misconduct by the plaintiff:

[Defendant-employer] contends that it would have made the same decision to [describe employment decision] [plaintiff] because of conduct that [defendant] discovered after it made the

6.4.3 Back Pay – For Advisory or Stipulated Jury

31 employment decision. Specifically, [defendant] claims that when it became aware of the [describe
32 the after-discovered misconduct], [defendant] would have made the decision at that point had it
33 not been made previously.

34 If [defendant] proves by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same
35 decision and would have [describe employment decision] [plaintiff] because of [describe after-
36 discovered evidence], you must limit any award of back pay to the date [defendant] would have
37 made the decision to [describe employment decision] [plaintiff] as a result of the after-acquired
38 information.]

39

40 **Comment**

41 Back pay awards are available against an employer under Section 1981. *See Johnson v. Ry*
42 *Express Agency, Inc.*, 421 U.S. 454, 459 (1975). A backpay award under Section 1981 is not
43 restricted to the two years specified for backpay recovery under Title VII. *Id.*

44 An award of back pay is an equitable remedy; thus there is no right to jury trial on a claim
45 for back pay. *See Laskaris v. Thornburgh*, 733 F.2d 260, 263 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting that a claim
46 for back pay is one for equitable relief, but that the plaintiff nonetheless had a right to jury trial on
47 his claims for compensatory damages); *Pollard v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.*, 532 U.S. 843
48 (2001) (noting that front pay and back pay are equitable remedies).

49 An instruction on back pay is nonetheless included because the parties or the court may
50 wish to empanel an advisory jury—especially given the fact that in most cases the plaintiff will be
51 seeking compensatory damages and the jury will be sitting anyway. *See Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(c)*.
52 Alternatively, the parties may stipulate to a jury determination on back pay, in which case this
53 instruction would also be appropriate. Instruction 6.4.1, on compensatory damages, instructs the
54 jury in such cases to provide separate awards for compensatory damages, back pay, and front pay.

55 For further commentary on back pay, see the Comment to Instruction 5.4.3.

6.4.4 Front Pay – For Advisory or Stipulated Jury

6.4.4 Section 1981 Damages — Front Pay — For Advisory or Stipulated Jury

Model

You may determine separately a monetary amount equal to the present value of any future wages and benefits that [plaintiff] would reasonably have earned from [defendant-employer] had [plaintiff] not [describe adverse employment action] for the period from the date of your verdict through a reasonable period of time in the future. From this figure you must subtract the amount of earnings and benefits [plaintiff] will receive from other employment during that time. [Plaintiff] has the burden of proving these damages by a preponderance of the evidence.

[If you find that [plaintiff] is entitled to recovery of future earnings from [defendant], then you must reduce any award by the amount of the expenses that [plaintiff] would have incurred in making those earnings.]

You must also reduce any award to its present value by considering the interest that [plaintiff] could earn on the amount of the award if [he/she] made a relatively risk-free investment. The reason you must make this reduction is because an award of an amount representing future loss of earnings is more valuable to [plaintiff] if [he/she] receives it today than if it were received at the time in the future when it would have been earned. It is more valuable because [plaintiff] can earn interest on it for the period of time between the date of the award and the date [he/she] would have earned the money. So you should decrease the amount of any award for loss of future earnings by the amount of interest that [plaintiff] can earn on that amount in the future.

[Add the following instruction if defendant claims “after-acquired evidence” of misconduct by the plaintiff:

[Defendant-employer] contends that it would have made the same decision to [describe employment decision] [plaintiff] because of conduct that [defendant] discovered after it made the employment decision. Specifically, [defendant] claims that when it became aware of the [describe the after-discovered misconduct], [defendant] would have made the decision at that point had it not been made previously.

If [defendant] proves by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same decision and would have [describe employment decision] [plaintiff] because of [describe after-discovered evidence], then you may not award [plaintiff] any amount for wages that would have been received from [defendant] in the future.]

6.4.4 Front Pay – For Advisory or Stipulated Jury

32

33

34 **Comment**

35 An award of front pay is an equitable remedy, as it provides a substitute for reinstatement.
36 *Berndt v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Sales, Inc.*, 789 F.2d 253, 260-61 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting
37 that “when circumstances prevent reinstatement, front pay may be an alternate remedy”). Thus
38 there is no right to a jury trial for a claim for front pay.

39 An instruction on front pay is nonetheless included because the parties or the court may
40 wish to empanel an advisory jury—especially given the fact that in most cases the plaintiff will be
41 seeking compensatory damages and the jury will be sitting anyway. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(c).
42 Alternatively, the parties may stipulate to a jury determination on front pay, in which case this
43 instruction would also be appropriate. *See Feldman v. Philadelphia Housing Auth.*, 43 F.3d 823,
44 832 (3d Cir. 1994) (upholding a jury’s determination of the amount of front pay due the plaintiff
45 in a Section 1983 employment action). Instruction 6.4.1, on compensatory damages, instructs the
46 jury in such cases to provide separate awards for compensatory damages, back pay, and front pay.

47 In *Monessen S.R. Co. v. Morgan*, 486 U.S. 330, 339 (1988), the Court held that “damages
48 awarded in suits governed by federal law should be reduced to present value.” (Citing *St. Louis*
49 *Southwestern R. Co. v. Dickerson*, 470 U.S. 409, 412 (1985).) The “self-evident” reason is that
50 “a given sum of money in hand is worth more than the like sum of money payable in the future.”
51 The Court concluded that a “failure to instruct the jury that present value is the proper measure
52 of a damages award is error.” *Id.* Accordingly, the instruction requires the jury to reduce the
53 award of front pay to present value. It should be noted that where damages are determined under
54 state law, a present value instruction may not be required under the law of certain states. *See*,
55 *e.g.*, *Kaczowski v. Bolubasz*, 491 Pa. 561, 421 A.2d 1027 (Pa. 1980) (advocating the “total
56 offset” method, under which no reduction is necessary to determine present value, as the value of
57 future income streams is likely to be offset by inflation).

1 **6.4.5 Section 1981 Damages — Nominal Damages**

2 **Model**

3 If you return a verdict for [plaintiff], but [plaintiff] has failed to prove actual injury and
4 therefore is not entitled to compensatory damages, then you must award nominal damages of \$
5 1.00.

6 A person whose federal rights were violated is entitled to a recognition of that violation,
7 even if [he/she] suffered no actual injury. Nominal damages (of \$1.00) are designed to
8 acknowledge the deprivation of a federal right, even where no actual injury occurred.

9 However, if you find actual injury, you must award compensatory damages (as I instructed
10 you), rather than nominal damages.

11

12 **Comment**

13 Nominal damages may be awarded under Section 1981. *See Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic*
14 *Products Corp.*, 772 F.2d 1250, 1259 (6th Cir. 1985) (award of nominal damages proper in absence
15 of absent proof of compensable injury) An instruction on nominal damages is proper when the
16 plaintiff has failed to present evidence of actual injury. However, when the plaintiff has presented
17 evidence of actual injury and that evidence is undisputed, it is error to instruct the jury on nominal
18 damages, at least if the nominal damages instruction is emphasized to the exclusion of appropriate
19 instructions on compensatory damages. Thus, in *Pryer v. C.O. 3 Slavic*, 251 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir.
20 2001), the district court granted a new trial, based partly on the ground that because the plaintiff
21 had presented “undisputed proof of actual injury, an instruction on nominal damages was
22 inappropriate.” In upholding the grant of a new trial, the Court of Appeals noted that “nominal
23 damages may only be awarded in the absence of proof of actual injury.” *See id.* at 453. The court
24 observed that the district court had “recognized that he had erroneously instructed the jury on
25 nominal damages and failed to inform it of the availability of compensatory damages for pain and
26 suffering.” *Id.* Accordingly, the court held that “[t]he court's error in failing to instruct as to the
27 availability of damages for such intangible harms, coupled with its emphasis on nominal damages,
28 rendered the totality of the instructions confusing and misleading.” *Id.* at 454.

29 Nominal damages may not exceed one dollar. *See Mayberry v. Robinson*, 427 F. Supp.
30 297, 314 (M.D. Pa. 1977) (“It is clear that the rule of law in the Third Circuit is that nominal
31 damages may not exceed \$1.00.”) (citing *United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker*, 535 F.2d 823,
32 830 (3d Cir. 1976)).